Gorbachev and His Reforms by Ludwikowski, Rett R.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
1986 
Gorbachev and His Reforms 
Rett R. Ludwikowski 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rett R. Ludwikowski, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 30 MOD. AGE 120 (1986). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Estimating the chances of economic recovery of the 
Soviet Union 
Gorbachev and His Reforms 
Rett R. Ludwikowski 
IN THE LAST year the Western press has 
given a great deal of publicity to the new 
attempts at economic reform in the Soviet 
Union. “Gorbachev Sets Shift in Econo- 
my,” “Gorbachev’s Vigor Holds Attention 
of Soviets,’’ “Gorbachev Orders Wide ‘Re- 
structuring’ of Soviet Economy”-these 
are the titles of only a few articles which 
examine Gorbachev’s “breath-taking de- 
termination to make changes in the 
Soviet economy.’’’ 
The general optimism as to the chances 
of Gorbachev’s reforms that accompanied 
these comments was based on Gor- 
bachev’s vigor, on the fact that he was the 
youngest Soviet leader to attain the posi- 
tion of Secretary General of the Com- 
munist party of the Soviet Union since 
Malenkov and recently was the youngest 
of his competitors in the Soviet Politburo? 
Gorbachev is also the first leader since 
Lenin to have completed regular higher 
education, and his dedication to the re- 
form of the Soviet economy was proved in 
the summer of 1981, when his lobby tried 
to defend a radical reform of Soviet agri- 
culture which was practically to exclude 
some sectors of agriculture from the sys- 
tem of central planning? The reform was 
never implemented because of the op- 
position of the conservative group in the 
Politburo (supported by Brezhnev and 
Prime Minister Tikhonov), but Gorbachev 
made his mark as a reformer. 
The more cautious commentators try 
to remind us that Yuri Andropov in his fist 
major policy address also freely ac- 
knowledged that the previous period had 
not solved the Soviet bloc’s most urgent 
problems and declared his determination 
to fight against inefficiency in agriculture, 
drunkenness, corruption, the black mar- 
ket, the general disintegration of the com- 
munist economy, and so forth. Some 
others mentioned that Andropov’s pre- 
decessors had made the same declara- 
tions when first addressing the Central 
Committee. As Martin Ebon, author of a 
biography of Andropov, was able to show, 
Andropov’s sharp criticism of the Com- 
munist bloc’s managerial deficiencies was 
almost identical to remarks by G.M. 
Malenkov thirty years before: 
In 1982 the optimistic Western assess- 
ment of the “new era of Soviet reforms” 
stemmed from tales about Andropov’s 
preddections for jazz, whisky, and Western 
novels. Now it is based on the fact that 
Gorbachev is “a man of a new generation,” 
on his expertise in agriculture, and on 
reports of his visit to Great Britain, where 
he was portrayed as “a civilized diplomat” 
with a sense of humor, “bright and tech- 
nically able to absorb new concepts of 
government and scien~e.”~ The American 
public can inquire with good reason: Why, 
despite these repeated optimistic prog- 
noses, has nothing changed substantially 
in the Soviet economy since Krushchev? 
True, the system did not collapse, but also, 
until recently, it did not show any symp- 
toms of a quick economic recovery. The 
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succession to the younger generation may 
result in attempts to introduce a new 
epoch of modest reformist transfor- 
mations. It is even very likely that eco- 
nomic stagnation will compel Corbachev 
to at least resume attempts at modifica- 
tion of the Soviet economy. Yet the suc- 
cess of the reforms is a function of a vari- 
able that is the sum total of many ele- 
ments-social, ideological, economic, po- 
litical. The personal characteristics of the 
Soviet leaders and their awareness of the 
deficiencies of the system are only one of 
the elements. As far as a substantive 
reconstruction, not a marginal modifica- 
tion, is concerned, the economically coun- 
terproductive elements of the system are 
more significant. They have worked and 
most probably will continue to work 
against any attempt at reform. They are 
worth careful examination. 
What Happened to the Communist 
Tollectiue Mentality”? 
THE CONSTITUTION OF the Soviet Union Says 
that state property-the principal form of 
socialist property-is subject to common 
ownership by the Soviet people (Article 
11). Soviet citizens are obliged to preserve 
and protect socialist property (Article 61). 
According to Marxism-Leninism, respect 
for collective values was supposed to 
follow the growing unity of individual and 
society. Socialist doctrine promoted the 
ideas of ultimate equality, freedom, and 
justice, and offered a belief that these 
goals could be accomplished only by a 
total reconciliation between individual 
and social interest. Awareness of the su- 
periority of shared interest to that of in- 
dividual interest was supposed to create a 
so-called collective mentality-a precon- 
dition for the further evolution of society 
toward communism. On behalf of the 
collective interest, not only all means of 
production and distribution, but also so- 
cial, moral, and even religious convictions 
were to be subject to public control. The 
individual’s rights and duties were to be 
determined by society. 
The attempt to create a “collective 
mentality” turned out to be a total failure. 
The concept, which in a way typified the 
Old Bolsheviks, fell victim to corrosion in 
the decades of Stalin’s rule. The fact that 
millions of people were encouraged and 
even forced to survive at the cost of 
others’ lives could not but drastically af- 
fect public morality. The role of a collec- 
tive in the formation of a socialist per- 
sonality was decidedly crippled. In fact, 
party propaganda notwithstanding, the 
collective in any true sense posed a threat 
to totalitarian control. The real aim of the 
collective as it developed under Stalin was 
not to bring people together, but to serve 
as an instrument for the annihilation of the 
individual approach to life and to promote 
the complete atomization of society. Artifi- 
cial communities created by the state 
were to destroy all genuine intermediate 
social structures. The destruction of all 
trust in mutual relations between people, 
the disintegration of family loyalty, and the 
denunciation of parents by their children 
were intended to weaken the distinction 
between truth and falsehood and to de- 
prive individuals of the capacity to form 
their own opinions. Religious beliefs were 
proclaimed to be in clear contradiction to 
the materialistic philosophy of com- 
munism. The moral impact of the Church 
was blocked, but was never replaced by 
any kind of Communist morality. Socialist 
collectives, which had been expected to 
replace the Church’s authority, never 
gained broad public respect. 
The Bolshevization of society resulted 
in its cultural and moral impoverishment, 
in the leveling of all groups to the lowest 
common denominator. “Social justice,” 
comprehended in this way, led in practice 
to the total subordination of private in- 
terests to some projection of “public 
good,” which was usually offered by a 
relatively small group of social leaders, 
who only pretended to speak on behalf of 
society as a whole. The total unity be- 
tween individual and society appeared to 
be nothing but a total destruction of hu- 
man individuality. When we discuss the 
difficulties of the Soviet economy and the 
prospects of economic reform, all of these 
factors must be taken into consideration. 
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Ideological and Moral Background 
of the Economic Crisis 
THE DECAY OF Communist ideology is un- 
doubtedly a leitmotif in all debates over 
the crisis in the Soviet political system. 
Numerous commentators on Soviet do- 
mestic problems like to emphasize the 
total decomposition of Marxism-Leninism 
in the Soviet bloc. They argue that in 
today’s Soviet bloc nobody takes ideologi- 
cal clichCs seriously. Party leaders are 
cynical and the public hates communism. 
As Vladimir Bukovsky has written, “From 
top to bottom, no one believes in Marxist 
dogma anymore, even though they con- 
tinue to measure their actions by it, refer 
to it, and use it as a stick to beat one 
another with: it is both a proof of their 
loyalty and a meal ticket.”6 
Some distinguished writers like Alek- 
sandr Solzhenitsyn hold that Marxism- 
Leninism is a dead ideology in the sense 
that “even during its best decades it was 
totally mistaken in its predictions and was 
never a science.” This completely false 
and harmful ideology is followed blindly 
by Soviet leaders, however. Their ad- 
herence to the precepts of Marxism- 
Leninism is a principal source of the nu- 
merous failures and blunders of the Soviet 
regime. “The spiritual renaissance of our 
country,” argues Solzhenitsyn, “lies in our 
liberation from this deadening, killing 
ide~logy.”~ 
Other writers, among whom Leszek 
Kolakowski is a prominent example, 
believe ideology is used in the Soviet bloc 
primarily as an instrument for legitimizing 
the power system. Kolakowski writes, 
“The socialist class of exploiters is not 
eager to retain and extend its power be- 
cause it professes a false doctrine (after 
all, throughout history despots did quite 
well without Marxism); rather, they ad- 
here to this doctrine as a tool to retain and 
extend their power.”s 
It is worth noting that discussion of the 
significance of Communist ideology usu- 
ally concentrates on the most recent 
symptoms of ideological crisis, while sel- 
dom if ever considering the economic and 
moral repercussions of ideological decay. 
This leaves an impression that the col- 
lapse of Communist ideology is a relatively 
recent occurrence. In fact, the role played 
by Marxism-Leninism has undergone vis- 
ible transformations throughout the dura- 
tion of Communist rule in Russia, and the 
ideological crisis has had much more ex- 
tensive consequences than is usually 
recognized. 
The Old Bolsheviks were masters of 
revolutionary techniques, but they had no 
experience in running a state. They knew 
how to subvert, destroy, and change; but 
they had little knowledge of how to build, 
create, or introduce more advanced in- 
stitutions, better economic techniques, or 
improved agricultural methods. For them 
Marxism served as a sort of sacred guide 
to be followed almost blindly. But ex- 
perience usually is a better teacher than 
theories are. The tenets of “genuine Marx- 
ism” often proved inapplicable in post- 
revolutionary Russia. Soon it appeared 
that the Bolshevik party, despite its ad- 
herence to Marxism, did not practice its 
basic assumptions. On the one hand, the 
Bolsheviks had to pervert Marx’s theory 
for their own purposes; on the other, they 
were not able to create a new theory. The 
solution hit upon was to appear to adhere 
to the basic dogmas of Marxism, while im- 
posing strictly controlled thought. The 
bigger their pragmatic deviations, the 
stronger they pretended to be the most 
orthodox followers of “scientific social- 
ism.” Marxism, or rather Marxism-Lenin- 
ism (which means Lenin’s Marxism), has 
never become a dead ideology. It played 
and still plays a significant role. 
The theory of Marxism-Leninism is suf- 
ficiently flexible to provide general prin- 
ciples which can be adopted by the regime 
and exploited as its stable theoretical 
background. At the same time, no doc- 
trinal tenets are sacrosanct under Soviet 
policy except insofar as they are useful to 
the ruling elite. As Daniel Bell has correct- 
ly pointed out, in the Soviet system “no 
single element of doctrine is a keystone 
whose removal would cause the collapse 
of Soviet ide~logy.”~ The regime armed 
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with totalitarian machinery does not need 
a precise guide to its actions. What it does 
require is general confirmation that the 
leaders are moving in the right direction; it 
needs a theoretical justification, and 
Marxism-Leninism is able to provide this 
disguise. 
Does this mean that ideology no longer 
causes Soviet leaders to act? In a literal 
sense, the answer is yes. This does not 
mean, however, that the role played by 
ideology is meaningless. Marxism-Lenin- 
ism long ago ceased to serve as the main 
guide to action, but it did not disappear. 
Though pragmatic Soviet leaders do not 
follow Marx’s recommendations literally, 
Communist rulers are forced to decorate 
their decisions and speeches with Marxian 
rhetoric. And this everyday contact with 
Marxist cliches and slogans has an inevit- 
able impact on their mentality. After all, 
adherence to Marxism-Leninism can be a 
source of difficulty, but it can also be very 
convenient. When at a loss for a solution 
to a policy question, party leaders can 
open the “sacred books” and find some 
“phrase” which, in the future, can justify 
even the most stupid decision. Obviously, 
in such a situation, mechanical application 
of Marxism can only exacerbate the con- 
sequences of a former inept policy, but the 
ideological facade is a useful weapon until 
a stronger contestant is able to pin a 
“revisionist” label on such an interpreta- 
tion. Viewed from the perspective of a 
Soviet leader, then, ideology can serve as 
a means of legitimization and delegitimiza- 
tion of political, economic, and social 
decisions-an excellent weapon in politi- 
cal and internal struggles, a justification of 
any international strategy. And, after all, it 
provides a stable theoretical background 
for the system. 
Ideology has also played an important 
social role. Its unifymg function-its role 
as a sort of “social cement”-has often 
been pointed out by Western political 
thinkers.I0 Ideology helped the ruling elite 
to maximize its control over the thinking 
and actions of individuals. It was a price- 
less method to mobilize public energy, an 
excellent instrument of political manipula- 
tion, an important means of shaping a 
political culture of the society. Indoctrina- 
tion was an effective form of political 
socialization which involved individuals in 
the political system. 
Ideological manipulation, once its ef- 
ficacy was discovered, was continually ex- 
ploited to totally invade the peoples’ 
minds. The state-controlled press and 
broadcasting system were transformed 
into one big “machinery of the lie.” Politi- 
cal education reached all groups in soci- 
ety. Special political schools, universities 
of Marxism-Leninism, study circles in the 
army, and special committees of political 
enlightenment in factories and in “houses 
of culture” were bound to create a “new 
communist individual” totally subservient 
to the party.” 
Despite all these precautions, it did not 
prove true that “lies continuously re- 
peated sound like truth.” The common 
sense of the public has never been totally 
destroyed by party indoctrination. True, 
some people began to accept ideology 
without question. The permanent repeat- 
ing of the same ideological lessons “totally 
stripped them of critical tho~ght.”’~ 
Others, however, ceased to react at all to 
ideological stimuli. The effectiveness of 
ideological manipulation has weakened 
considerably in the last forty years. The 
repeated Soviet “counterrevolutions” and 
“periods of deviations”-the successive 
disclosures of the fallacies in the regime- 
had gradually destroyed the “magic” of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
This growing ideological crisis has been 
most strongly felt in the middle ranks of 
society in the Soviet bloc. This “center” of 
the social structure of a Communist so- 
ciety consists of three important groups. 
The fist-consisting of those who live in 
so-called internal emigration-includes 
those who are almost totally indifferent to 
political issues, neither believing in ideo- 
logical cliches nor willing to fight against 
them. They do not accept the regime, but 
their main concern is merely “to be left 
alone.” The second group, the passive ob- 
servers, brings together skeptics and op- 
portunists, who do not refuse participa- 
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tion in the regime but try to minimize it. 
Though not believing in the Communist 
ideology, they are ready to follow cyni- 
cally those who offer the biggest benefits 
and to pay lip service to those ideological 
clichCs which are most profitable at the 
moment. The third group-and the one 
which is most important for Communist 
leaders-consists of the “active par- 
ticipants,” who really believe in the re- 
gime’s ideological goals and are whole- 
heartedly engaged in the creation of “a 
Soviet World Republic.” This group pro- 
vides the party with members who are 
ready not only to make party careers, but 
also to fight for the future of communism. 
The continuous dwindling of this group, 
which in certain Communist-ruled coun- 
tries has almost ceased to exist, is the 
most spectacular effect of the crisis of 
Communist ideology. 
The window-dressing character of 
Marxism-Leninism has had important so- 
cial, moral, and economic repercussions, 
however, which were scarcely noticed at 
the time either by Communist rulers or 
Western commentators. The fact that 
ideological criteria were losing credibility 
as the standard of social behavior in- 
evitably led to the creation of a double 
standard of public morality. Under pres- 
sure from the regime, the public had to 
observe ideological tenets although they 
could not be forced to respect them. 
Books without substance, even if they are 
useful decorations, are not taken seri- 
ously. 
Ideology served for a while to hamper 
the process of moral corrosion in socialist 
societies. Communism itself is a sort of 
religion. The blind belief in Marxist- 
Leninist dogmas deprived society of the 
capability to think independently; but 
ideology did serve, on the other hand, to 
provide a sort of “quasi-moral” dogma 
which reduced the pure cynicism of in- 
dividual attitudes. As ideological values 
began to lose their authority, however, 
this resulted in a further drastic decline in 
public morality. The awareness of ideo- 
logical decay corrupted a generation of 
party members. They came to understand 
that, in fact, coercion is useful not to pro- 
tect ideological values but to protect their 
own privileges-privileges which are ob- 
tainable by simple loyalty to the party elite 
and which, in any other circumstances, 
would not be tolerated by society. The 
lack of ideological illusions helped create 
what Lenin called “conventional hypoc- 
risy.” The devaluation of ideology has had 
an equally demoralizing effect on the rest 
of society. Workers began to realize that a 
double standard of morality means one 
morality for the party elite and another for 
nonparty people and even for ordinary 
party members. They realized that cor- 
ruption had become institutionalized by 
the system-so much so that it had be- 
come the unofficial method of distributing 
goods which were scarcely available on 
the open market. 
This realization has become a major 
detriment to the system of public proper- 
ty: the central characteristic of com- 
munism. The ordinary citizen argues that 
if state doctrine is only a facade, then 
public property-sanctified by the ideol- 
ogy-actually belongs to no one. Hence 
the “seizure” of public property has noth- 
ing to do with theft. It is prohibited by law 
but not stamped by public morality. Or 
rather, to be more precise, there are two 
public moralities, official and private. If an 
act of “seizure” of public property is of- 
ficially revealed, an individual will be pub- 
licly condemned otherwise, even if the act 
is broadly known, he will not meet public 
ostracism but, in many instances, un- 
derstanding and assistance. In the double 
standard of public morality, the rule of 
“live and let live” has become sacrosanct. 
For decades party leaders believed that 
the state derived many benefits from this 
rule, which was commonly known and ac- 
cepted by the authorities. According to an 
unofficial party interpretation, it made 
sense to tolerate a moderate level of cor- 
ruption. Among its advantages from the 
state’s point of view was the fact that the 
public seemed more intimidated, more de- 
pendent on the authorities, more control- 
lable. Under such a system, those who 
steal can be condemned at any time. If 
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public opinion accepts that everyone 
steals if he wants to live, it will accept the 
fact that everyone can be punished if the 
state so desires. The individual must live 
with the impression that the state’s toler- 
ance can cease at any time. 
This does not mean that the Communist 
party consciously created the system of 
“double morality.’’ The party simply ac- 
cepted it and tried to derive from it as 
many benefits as possible. Every coin has 
two sides, however. With time the advan- 
tages of such a strategy seemed less and 
less clear-cut. The collapse of public 
morality contributed explicitly to all of the 
distresses of the Soviet economy men- 
tioned above: low labor discipline, neglect 
of equipment, absenteeism, bribery, un- 
productive work, total lack of interest in 
quality output, and so forth. Society 
created new unofficial techniques of social 
compensation for the unfairness of com- 
munism, methods of competition for 
benefits available only in backstage strug- 
gles, means of circumventing the pretend- 
ed social equality. The system created not 
only a black market and other corruption, 
but also unofficial channels through which 
decisions of all kinds are made. A “double 
morality,” in fact, is linked with the “dou- 
ble life” of the whole society. 
As Arnold Beichman and Mikhail S. 
Bernstein have pointed out, “The ‘second 
economy,’ or the ‘gray-black’ economy, is 
what makes the Soviet state function. The 
‘second economy’ is what makes life bear- 
able for everybody. The consumer can ob- 
tain various kinds of food, goods, and ser- 
vices otherwise unobtainable in official 
shops. The people who provide these 
foods, goods, and services profit and can 
in turn better their life through the ‘second 
economy.’ The ‘second economy’ system 
is what provides the incentives for people 
to produce. To weaken these incentives by 
a drive against ‘corruption’ will decrease 
what productivity exists n0w.”13 Lower- 
level party leaders watch carefully for 
every possibility of grasping privileges 
which they still do not possess. Backstage 
mechanisms, corruptive techniques, un- 
official strategies-all are part of their 
Modern Age 
repertoire. Thanks to the lack of demo- 
cratic control, such techniques are in- 
herent in the Bolshevik system of power, 
which protects all its fossilized com- 
ponents. The Soviet “vicious circle” is also 
closed around the sphere of public 
morality. 
The ‘Dictatorship of Ignoramuses” 
comers from the Eastern bloc concerns 
the competence of the nomenklatura peo- 
ple, who occupy hundreds of thousands of 
important posts in science, education, 
agriculture, and ind~stry.’~ Is it really true 
that their ineptitude results in incalculable 
losses for the Communist economy? Are 
they really so incompetent and their de- 
cisions so foolish? Before we delve deeper 
into this problem, some explanation of the 
transformation the system of party bu- 
reaucracy has undergone in the post- 
Stalinist period will be required. 
The death of Stalin began a new era for 
the regime. It was obvious that the system 
created by Stalin had been consolidated 
and that the absence of its creator did not 
jeopardize its basic tenets. The crucial 
principle of one-party rule, which in fact 
meant the power of a small elite headed 
by a single leader, was left untouched. Yet 
the system required some modification. In 
Stalin’s time, even the top-ranking mem- 
bers of the party elite felt extremely in- 
secure. This inevitably reduced the appeal 
of a party career. The younger generation 
of party leaders was much more prag- 
matic, much less dedicated to revolution- 
ary ideas. They wanted to enjoy their 
“share in power” without the risks that 
had accompanied their predecessors’ 
endeavors. 
At the same time, the system of “sup- 
plementation” of the acting party elite re- 
quired some improvement. Krushchev’s 
generation understood perfectly Vilfredo 
Pareto’s theory of the “circulation of 
elites.” The rule of the party elite, “the 
guiding force of the proletariat,” was taken 
for granted as well as the truth that elites 
ruled in all societies. Yet their success 
depended upon their degree of flexibility. 




Only “open” elites, which were ready to 
co-opt the most flexible social elements, 
were able to survive. Based on this prem- 
ise, the Communist party concluded that it 
had to involve more groups in its politics 
by giving them the impression that they 
might be able to participate in the de- 
cision-making process. The only qualifica- 
tion for co-optation into higher ranks was 
to be acceptance of the politics of those 
currently running the party and skill in 
presenting ideological cliches. 
In looking for recruits, party leaders ob- 
viously sought people from whom both 
loyalty and expertise could be expected. 
Unfortunately, the combination of both 
characteristics in the same people was 
hard to find. In fact, a system based on ar- 
bitrary decisions frequently changed by 
the party leaders could not really wel- 
come experts. On the contrary, pro- 
fessional skills and values were incompat- 
ible with the principle of partiinost, which 
declared that the party was always right. 
The system led to the method of “negative 
selection,” which promoted only com- 
pliant, conformable yes men. Individuals 
who combined this trait with a particular 
ruthlessness had the best prospects for 
party careers. In fact, nomenklatura did 
not require traditional education, but 
rather these “talents” of a special type. 
Party officers and managers were not 
selected on the basis of professional or 
even bureaucratic ability. Professionals 
who could think independently and crit- 
icize openly were disqualified as can- 
didates for nomenklatura positions. To the 
party elite, reliability was far more im- 
portant. 
To perform routine activities through- 
out the country, the regime had to replace 
Stalinist terror with a more effective sys- 
tem of rewards and motivations. As a 
result, unaccountabdity, tolerance for ir- 
responsibility, incompetence, and corrup- 
tion became the price paid in exchange for 
loyalty of the nomenklatura to the party 
elite. As long as a person on the list did not 
act against the party elite, he usually could 
expect to remain in one nornenkliltura 
position or another, regardless of his fit- 
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ness for the job. Anyone who demon- 
strated extreme stupidity or incom- 
petence was simply transferred to another 
post, thereby developing the impression 
that, in exchange for his loyalty, he would 
gain security and the protection of the 
system. 
The party elite consisted of persons 
who, though they competed among them- 
selves, were capable of mutually support- 
ing one another against threats from out- 
side the party system which could 
jeopardize their careers. Thanks to these 
arrangements, the system was relatively 
fluid and able to survive the long period of 
totalitarian rule. The multitudinous no- 
menklatura allowed the Communist party 
to involve a sizable group of adaptable 
people in its affairs. To be on the nomen- 
klatura list meant having a better-paying 
job, a better apartment and a car, better 
and quicker prospects for promotion to a 
higher bureaucratic office, an impression 
of protection and immunity, and participa- 
tion in the decision-making process. In 
return, one had only to follow the party 
line. To oppose this line meant being de- 
prived of everything; it meant having one’s 
career ended instantly. 
The successful climb to the top of the 
party pyramid instills in the mind of an ap- 
paratchik, or party technocrat, the con- 
viction that ruling others is his own per- 
sonal right. He begins to treat a Commu- 
nist enterprise, factory, educational cen- 
ter, or hospital as his own possession. A 
member of the nomenklatura experiences 
an emperor-like power in his territory. He 
begins to reward friends and relatives, 
punish enemies, and modify decisions in 
return for bribes. The process of climbing 
to the top seems itself to legitimize his 
conduct. 
In a closed society that does not toler- 
ate any open criticism, professionals will 
always pose a threat to the secure posi- 
tion of the leaders. Incompetent party 
leaders personally not only interfere in 
detailed economic problems, but also ap- 
parently even feel an obligation to do so. 
Every step in their political careers 




and that they share infallibility of a sort 
with the entire organization. The party and 
its vanguard cannot err. This system does 
not need and cannot endure experts who 
could reveal the mistakes of the ruling 
elite. Mistakes are not possible because “a 
defeat” is something alien to communism. 
That reasoning closes this “vicious circle”; 
if the party and its leaders cannot be 
wrong, then every economic failure of the 
acting leadership must be presented as a 
victory. Except during periods of succes- 
sion crisis, when predecessors can be 
criticized, the leadership shows a total in- 
ability to break out of this economic and 
political deadlock. The “dictatorship of ig- 
noramuses” (as it was called by Stefan 
Kisielewski) is a permanent component of 
the Soviet system. 
What Handicaps the 
Decision-Making Process? 
EVERY STUDENT OF bureaucratic structures 
knows well that no decision-making proc- 
ess can prove effective without at least 
several basic elements: competence, in- 
formation, coordination, responsibility of 
policy-makers, control over the imple- 
mentation of decisions, and capability to 
learn from mistakes. In the preceding ex- 
amination, the first item on this brief list 
was found sadly lacking. It must be said, 
besides, that the Soviet system is equally 
deficient in the rest of the necessary 
elements. 
A study of how policy choices are made 
in the Soviet bloc finds that central plan- 
ning, the policy-making process, and the 
implementation of crucial decisions are 
profoundly affected by the permanent 
lack of proper information. All bureau- 
cratic organizations are built to act on 
rational premises. It is true that decision- 
making always involves some nonrational 
components when decisions take place 
under uncertainty and when the conse- 
quences of the choices are unknown. But 
the problem that handicaps the socialist 
economy is not simply the presence of 
nonrational factors in the decision-making 
process, but rather the overwhelming de- 
gree to which such nonrational deter- 
minants contribute to the final decision. 
Because of the predominance of non- 
rational factors, important choices are 
made without proper calculation, and wild 
predictions take the place of rational cost- 
benefit analysis. In the socialist system, 
which not only lacks proper information 
but is actually based on misinformation, 
the odds of increasing the role of rational 
factors in planning and decision-making 
are quite small. Without proper informa- 
tion, socialist decision-making processes 
will never fit the rational model. 
Why is adequate information unavail- 
able in Soviet economic management? It 
has often been emphasized by Western 
analysts that misinformation is a signifi- 
cant strategy in Soviet foreign policy and 
that propaganda and censorship help to 
manipulate political attitudes in the Soviet 
bloc.15 To exist, the system has to be pro- 
tected from real information. Only selec- 
ted information without alternatives can 
be approved. Information shapes the 
political culture of society, and Com- 
munist leaders cannot afford to relinquish 
the dissemination of information which 
serves as a convenient instrument of 
power. While misinformation was seen as 
the means of subjugating society and 
manipulating public attitudes, it was pre- 
sumed that the party elite, which had at its 
disposal a widespread system of police 
control, was itself perfectly informed 
about the true state of things. The numer- 
ous party cadres subordinated to top 
party leaders were supposed to help 
maintain military control over the coun- 
try, monopoly control of all means of 
communication and education, and com- 
plete state control over the economy; 
they were also responsible for providing 
perfect information to their superiors.This 
is a complete misunderstanding of the real 
situation in socialist countries. The system 
which successfully keeps individuals to- 
tally obedient and almost completely de- 
prived of all forms of privacy is entirely 
lacking any effective means of economic 
information or control. 
In fact, the large number of overlapping 
intermediary organizations badly hampers 
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the decision-making process. Function- 
aries of all ranks are equally interested in 
“success” and ready to misinform the cen- 
tral authorities. The hierarchical pyramid 
of control simply does not work. If the 
party cannot be wrong, then “success” 
must accompany all Communist econom- 
ic endeavours. This accounts for the fact 
that the party is totally incapable of learn- 
ing from its mistakes. The constant push 
for economic success leads to the “over- 
fulfillment” of all plans and the inclination 
to “maximize” output without regard for 
quality. I t  leads managers who are reward- 
ed only for “successes” to conceal the real 
inefficiency of their enterprises. In a sys- 
tem in which production of predetermined 
quantities is the essential indicator of suc- 
cess, there are weak incentives to strive 
for more efficient production or reduction 
of expenditures. 
Misinformation is implicit in the organi- 
zational inadequacies of the Communist 
system. Some managers fake the ac- 
counts; others artificially exaggerate the 
quantity of production. In Polish coal 
mines, Solidarity revealed the existence of 
special machines that were imported to 
mix rock and soil with coal to double the 
apparent output. And, what is more para- 
doxical, the central authorities prefer not 
to be well-informed. A friend of mine 
working on statistics at the police criminal 
office once explained to me how reports 
on criminal activity were put together. His 
task was to “improve” the data received 
from each police station to show a lower 
level of crime. “The Ministry of Internal Af- 
fairs,” he explained, “would then review 
the composite report and most probably 
send it back for ‘proofreading’-a eu- 
phemism for a downward revision of the 
figures. It is the routine procedure, re- 
peated in each reporting period, regard- 
less of the originally quoted figures.” It is 
obvious that in this situation, providing the 
correct information would certainly 
amount to self-denunciation. 
Inadequate information and deliberate- 
ly distorted statistics handicap all eco- 
nomic planning and cripple all coordina- 
tion. Harmonious functioning of the eco- 
nomic sections for more effective results 
cannot properly be established, if for no 
other reason than the shortages of mate- 
rial of which production has been ex- 
aggerated in statistics. This causes supply 
dislocation and competition for resources 
between enterprises which, theoretically, 
should not exist in socialist industry. 
Further contribution to the lack of ac- 
curate statistics and empirical data comes 
from the partiinost mentality of the Cen- 
tral Offices for Control of Press, Publica- 
tion, and Performances. Their official 
Books of Directives and Recommen- 
dations set forth detailed instructions for 
the elimination of any negative comments 
on party decisions or any reference to offi- 
cial blunders or bungling. This obviously 
makes any serious discussion of economic 
fallacies impossible. Under such broad 
censorship, basic economic, social, and 
political information goes unpublished. 
Costly scandals and blunders in urban 
planning, housing, and agriculture; irra- 
tional decisions and investments; location 
and production facts are withheld from 
the public. All scientific disciplines which 
are based on statistics are hampered by 
such politics.I6 Reliance on similar misin- 
formation, economic naivete unsupported 
by genuine economic research, and the 
arbitrariness of decisions made by central 
authorities go a long way toward explain- 
ing the economic weakness of all Com- 
munist countries. 
Reformation proposals usually focus on 
a program of decentralization of the man- 
agerial system and emphasize the need for 
creating a system basing incentives on 
profit, increasing efficiency and discipline, 
giving greater responsibility to local mana- 
gers, et cetera. Each new party “team” has 
repeated that the decentralization of 
decision-making could begin the real re- 
covery of the Communist system. Each 
has soon realized, however, that decen- 
tralization is incompatible with the politi- 
cal aspirations of the Communist leader- 
ship. On one hand, it is obvious that, given 
the lack of proper information at the top, 
local managers are better equipped to 
deal with economic reality. On the other 
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hand, short of returning to a system of 
market stimulants, the system of central 
control could be replaced only by the su- 
pervision of local workers’ committees. 
But this solution could endanger party 
dominance. Economic power, once shifted 
to the working class, would lead to the 
growth of political power for the masses. 
Communist theory assumes that political 
and economic resources of power are in- 
separable. The totalitarian system cannot 
be transformed into one that is merely au- 
thoritarian without posing a real threat to 
the ruling elite. Rank-and-file bureaucrats 
at the center are afraid of losing power, 
and their influence and even their jobs 
might be threatened. For this reason, at- 
tempts at decentralization have been uni- 
formly superficial. In their final effect, such 
“reforms” have brought about only the 
further extension of bureaucracy and the 
creation of new intermediate bureaucratic 
structures which serve merely to convey 
the real decision made by functionaries at 
the center. Nor is this surprising, since 
both central and regional administrators 
want power, not responsibility. The center 
does not want to lose the appearance of 
economic control; the local agencies want 
to share power while bearing no respon- 
sibility for economic results. Barring fun- 
damental changes in the system, there- 
fore, it would be naive to expect that 
administrators will voluntarily accept 
more responsibility than absolutely nec- 
essary. People are not angels. It is difficult 
enough (and Communists disregard this 
totally) for them to be human beings. 
TO RECAPITULATE M y  analysis, I do not ex- 
pect a recovery of the socialist economy 
for the following reasons: 
(1) The system has forever destroyed 
the so-called collective mentality, which 
was supposed to be a basic component of 
Communist political culture. 
(2) The crisis of Communist ideology is 
irreversible. The belief of the masses in 
Marxism-Leninism cannot be reconstruct- 
ed, yet socialist leaders will not give up ob- 
solete dogmas because they do not know 
how to function without them. 
(3) The ideological crisis has under- 
mined the rudiments of Communist mor- 
ality and corroded all Marxist-Leninist 
values, including the key dogma of com- 
mon ownership. 
(4) The moral and ideological crisis has 
killed all healthy incentives among work- 
ers and managers. 
(5) Without the rudiments of democ- 
racy people can be forced to work, but not 
to work efficiently. They will operate pur- 
suant to the principle: “Those at the top 
pretend to share power with us; we pre- 
tend to work.” On the other hand, demo- 
cratic transformations are too dangerous 
for the ruling elite, They are simply incom- 
patible with the totalitarian framework of 
the system. 
(6) The double standard of morality, 
together with massive- economic dis- 
locations, has created a black market and 
other corruption, which have been toler- 
ated for so long that they are now ir- 
revocably integrated in the way of life in 
Communist countries. 
(7) The need for creating a relatively 
open party elite forced the party to build a 
system of “negative selection” that pro- 
motes compliant, conformable yes men, 
who care far more about their careers 
than about the system of Communist 
values. 
(8) Lack of competence, widespread 
corruption, and unaccountability of de- 
cision-makers are incompatible with the 
basic principles of economic efficiency. 
(9) Lack of information, coordination, 
and proper control over the implementa- 
tion of productive decisions, coupled with 
a form of decentralization that is more ap- 
parent than real, cripple the socialist sys- 
tem of central planning and decision- 
making. 
(10) Without the party bureaucracy 
and nomenklatura people, the party can- 
not function; but with them, no reform is 
possible. Both are key ingredients of a sys- 
tem which can be crushed but not re- 
formed. They are an inseparable part of 
the system. 
In 1982 some Western scholars referred 
to Andropov’s plan of reform as “the task 
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of Hercules in cleaning the Augean 
stables.”17 To the extent the “task” refers 
to real reform and not a tiny “cleaning,” 
the attempts of Corbachev will more 
nearly resemble the Sisyphean Labors. 
The system itself has suppressed eco- 
nomic vitality and spontaneity, protected 
its own incurability, and locked its leaders 
in the “vicious circle” created by their pre- 
)The Washington Post, March 12, June 4, 12, 16, 17, 
and 21, 1985.2Lenin when he reached this position 
was 47, Stalin 50, Malenkov 51, Krushchev 59, Brezh- 
nev 58, Andropov 68, Chernenko 71. 3See Arnold 
Beichman and Mikhail S. Bernstam, Andropov: New 
Challenge to the West (New York, 1983), pp. 198-208. 
4Martin b n ,  The Andropov File (New York, 1983), 
p. 132. SThe Washington Post? March 12, 1985. 
GQuoted in Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, 
Contemporary Souiet Politics: An Introduction (En- 
glewood Cliffs, NJ., 1982), p. 37. 7Aleksandr Solzhe- 
nitsyn, Warning to the West (New York, 1976), p. 114. 
SLeszek Kolakowski, “Ideology in Eastern Europe,” in 
East Central Europe: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, 
ed. Milorad Drachkovitch (Stanford, Calif., 1982), p. 
45.gDaniel Bell, “The End of Ideology in the Soviet 
Union,” in Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary 
World-Its Appeals and Paradoxes, ed. Milorad 
Drachkovitch (Stanford, Calif., 1966), p. 107. IKorn- 
pare the views of Joseph M. Bochensld and Daniel 
Bell, Marxist Ideologry in the Contemporary World, 
pp. 60-120. IISee Robert Conquest, Politics ofldeas in 
the USSR (London, 1967), pp. 97-117. IzCompare the 
examination of k Zinoviewv‘s points on thii matter in 
Kolakowsld, “Ideology in Eastern Europe,” p. 44. 
Weichman and Bernstam, Andropou, p. 202. 14The 
decessors. If I am asked whether this “vi- 
cious circle’’ will compel the Soviet lead- 
ers to return to the negotiation table (after 
Reykjavik talks) my answer is affirmative. 
If the question refers to the chances for 
economic recovery of the Soviet system, 
the answer follows the old Roman for- 
mula: Quod natura negat, reddere nemo 
potest. 
system of nomenklatura was established during 1946 
and 1947, and it consisted originally of about 40,000 
newly promoted officials and newly approved old ap- 
paratchiks. In the 1950s this network was substan- 
tially extended. See Beichman and Bernstam, An- 
dropov, p. 103. %ee Richard H. Schultz and Roy 
Godson, Dezinformatsia, Active Measures in Soviet 
Strategy (Washington, 1984). official book of 
censorship reads like a historical novel. Here are a 
few examples from one of them: “Figures illustrating 
the state and growth of alcoholism on a national 
scale are not to appear in the mass media.” “All infor- 
mation about the direct threat of industry and the 
use of chemicals in agriculture to human life and 
health must be expunged.” “Information concerning 
Poland‘s purchase of licenses from capitalist coun- 
tries is to be eliminated from the mass media.” “All 
publications presenting general statistics with regard 
to conditions of safety and hygiene at work or to oc- 
cupational diseases must be withheld.” “Absolutely 
no information is to be published concerning the 
Katowice mine disaster in which four miners lost 
their lives.” Official Censorship in the Polish People’s 
Republic (Ann Arbor, 1978), p. 4. l7Ebon, The An- 
dropov File, pp. 128-29. 
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